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OPENING THE DOOR: RECOGNIZING THE MANY HATS OF
JOCKEYS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION COVERAGE
ERIN N. MALONY*
I. INTRODUCTION
No matter the industry, workers' compensation insurance coverage
consistently generates controversy about everything from administrative
policies to health care provider restrictions. Few issues, however, cause as
many controversies as the failure to cover an entire occupation. Of those
few occupations not covered, due to the danger of their sport, jockeys
struggle significantly to obtain workers' compensation coverage.
Workers' compensation insurance is a creature of statute and is
governed almost entirely by state law; therefore, the highly mobile jockey
population is potentially exposed to thirty-six different types of systems.
Of the thirty-eight states that authorize horse racing, only four states offer
coverage.' Surprisingly, Kentucky is not among them. New York, New
Jersey, Maryland, and California include jockeys in their state mandatory
compensation systems, but elsewhere jockeys are vulnerable. In 2006,
Kentucky Governor Ernie Fletcher proposed adding jockeys to his state's
existing system, but the Kentucky legislature rejected his proposal. This
rejection illustrates the political difficulty that jockeys face in acquiring
workers' compensation benefits. Their own union has been rocked by
scandal,5 and the insurance coverage promised them by that union is no
longer available. 6 Further compounding the problem, only four states have
stepped in to fill the void.
Ochoa v. Department of Washington Labor and Industries7
illustrates the difficulties facing the horse racing industry in insuring its
employees. Ochoa involved an appeal from a Washington Court of
" Staff Member, KENTUCKY JOURNAL OF EQUINE, AGRICULTURE, &
NATURAL RESOURCES

LAW, 2008-2009. B.A. 2007, J.D. expected May 2010, University of Kentucky.
' Vicki Smith, Plight of West Virginia Jockey Leads to Outcry for Workers Comp, SAN
FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE,
Jan.
21,
2006,
available
at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=-/n/a/2006/01/21/state/nl 95055 S59.DTL&type=health.
2See id.

3id.
4 See Chris Isidore, SportsBiz: Jockeys Need a Lift After Union's Troubles, CNNMONEY,
May 4, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/05/04/commentary/columnsportsbiz/sportsbiz/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
5id.
6 Lynch Ryan, Jockeys: Coverage Update and a Scandal, WORKERS COMP INSIDER, January
30, 2006, http://www.workerscompinsider.com/archives/000429.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2009).
7Ochoa v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. (Ochoa 11), 20 P.3d 939 (Wash. 2001).
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Appeals decision that denied benefits to a licensed jockey who was injured
while employed as an exercise rider for a particular trainer.
The
Washington Supreme Court's holding concentrated on whether a jockey,
like other types of employees, could act in a variety of capacities despite his
sole licensure as a jockey. 9 Reaching a decision on this question required
the court to carefully interpret its own statute generally granting benefits
and the specific exclusion of jockeys from the universal scheme of
coverage.' Although both the District Court and state Court of Appeals
affirmed the Board's decision, the Washington State Supreme Court
granted benefits to Ochoa."1 In holding that Ochoa was entitled to
mandatory, as opposed to elective, coverage the Washington Supreme
Court offered a nuanced view of the statute reflective of actual horse
industry practice and opened a door to at least some coverage for jockeys,
depending on their activity at the time of injury.12
In Section II of this Comment, focus is on the general statutory
scheme in Washington, examining what kinds of benefits are available, and
to whom. In addition, the administrative appeals process will be discussed.
Section III reviews the background of this particular case and its history,
while Section IV discusses the analysis of the state Supreme Court. Section
V examines the implications of the court's holding on the inclusion of
jockeys in state mandatory workers' compensation schemes.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A.

Workers' Compensation Overview (Washington)

As with all states, workers' compensation coverage in Washington
is a statutory right, meaning that the legislature has considered whom to
include and exclude from the compensation system. 13 This principle is
clearly reflected in the basic statutory architecture of Washington's
Industrial Insurance Act ("the Act").' 4 RCW § 51.12.010 extends
application of the Act to all employments within the jurisdiction of the Act,
and it is immediately followed by the legislature's list of exclusions.' 5
Subsection 7 explicitly exempts from coverage "[j]ockeys while
participating in or preparing horses for race meets licensed by the

' Id. at 940-41.
9Id.at 943.
'0 Id. at 941, 943.
" Id. at 940-41.
12 Ochoa 11, 20 P.3d at 943.
3
Id.at 941.
14 Washington's Industrial Insurance Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12 etseq. (2009).
15WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.020 (2009).
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16
Washington horse racing commission pursuant to chapter 67.16 RCW.'
For those not explicitly exempted from coverage, however, the title
proceeds to define the terms employer 7 and worker, I" then notes a general
multi-factor exception to mandatory coverage. 19 It is important to note
these definitions because both jockeys and exercise riders cleanly fall
within their parameters. Without the specific exemption from coverage for
jockeys 20 both would fall within the state compensation scheme. Neither
jockeys nor exercise riders fall within the generalized exception to the
definitions of "employer" and "worker". 2' Trainers, owners, and stables
qualify as employers because they contract with workers for their personal
labor.22 Washington's statute further defines workers as "every person...
engaged in the employment of an employer under this title," and exercise
riders fall easily within this definition. Therefore, because exercise riders
are not specifically exempted, they constitute a covered occupation.
Furthermore, had the legislature not specifically exempted jockeys one
could reasonably assume this group could also obtain coverage.
Once absorbed into the system, employees in Washington are
statutorily entitled to a variety of benefits if they are injured while in the
course of their employment.24 First, the workers' compensation fund will
cover the expenses of receiving medical care for the injury, including
hospital care.25 A notice requirement contained in the statute forces
employees to inform their employers of any injury.2 6 The system also
provides compensation schedules for those who are permanently or
partially disabled as a result of an on-the-job injury, in addition to the

16id.

17 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.070 (2009) (defining employer as "any person, body of
persons, corporate or otherwise, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer, all while engaged
in this state in any work covered by the provisions of this title, by way of trade or business, or who
contracts with one or more workers, the essence of which is the personal labor of such worker or

workers").

18WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2009) (defining worker as "every person in this state who

is engaged in the employment of an employer under this title, whether by way of manual labor or

otherwise in the course of his or her employment; also every person in this state who is engaged in the
employment of or who is working under an independent contract, the essence of which is his or her
personal labor for an employer under this title, whether by way of manual labor or otherwise, in the

course of his or her employment, or as an exception to the definition of worker, a person is not a worker
if he or she meets the tests set forth in subsections (1) through (6) of RCW 51.08.195 or the separate
tests set forth in RCW 51.08.181 for work performed that requires registration under chapter 18.27
RCW or licensing under chapter 19.28 RCW").
19WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195(1)-(6) (2009).
20 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.020(7) (2009).
21 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195 (2009).
22 See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.070 (2009).
23 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.180 (2009).
24 WASH.
25 WASH.
26 WASH.

REV. CODE § 51.32.015 (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.36.010 (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.28.010 (2009).
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injured person's medical care.27 For those who are Permanently disabled,
Washington offers payment for a personal attendant.
RCW § 51.32.060(1) also guarantees receipt of a percentage of
former wages, based on marital status and the injured person's number of
children.29 Those injured are also entitled to payments for temporary total
disability, and subsection (3) provides compensation for loss of earning
power.3 ° In addition, the state offers workers vocational rehabilitation,3'
compensation for an occupational disease,3 2 and perhaps
most importantly
33
employment protection and time-loss compensation.
RCW § 49.78.280 guarantees that a worker's job remains available
if he or she must take leave for serious illness.34 In addition, if a worker is
injured in the course of his or her employment, he or she is entitled to
compensation from the employer for lost wages-the wages the employee
would have earned had he or she not been injured.3" Given the extensive
coverage offered to beneficiaries of the workers' compensation system,
Washington's exclusion of those who will certainly be repetitively injured
is understandable. However, review of the benefits offered makes starkly
clear what jockeys in particular are denied by exclusion from insurance. It
also highlights the importance of Ochoa's case, which could offer an
avenue for some coverage to a group that remains otherwise uninsured.
In order to obtain these benefits, workers must navigate through a
specified claims process within the state's Department of Labor and
Industries ("the Department"). Ochoa represents a typical case. In a fairly
simple process, a worker must file a claim with the state Department of
Labor and Industries within one year of the injury.36 The statute also
requires the employee to file a copy of the medical report from their
attending physician with his workers' compensation claim.3 7 If the worker
does not notify the employer of the injury, the state will do so

27 WASH.

REV. CODE § 51.32.080 (2009).

28 WASH.

REV. CODE § 51.32.060(3) (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.32.060(1) (2009).

29 WASH.

30 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090(1), (3) (2009).

31WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.098 (2009).
32 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.180 (2009).
33 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090 (2009) allows for temporary total disability to follow
the

fee schedule for permanent disability, which entitle the worker to various percentage compensation for
wages. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.060(1) (2009). WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.090 also requires the
employer to allow the employee to return to light duty, if light duty is available. Furthermore, WASH.
REV. CODE §51.48.025 (2009) prohibits employers from retaliating in the form of discharge or
discrimination on the basis of the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Read together, these
provisions show that the scheme intends to protect a worker's ability to return to work and prevent
dismissal merely because of an injury incurred in the line of work.
3

See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.78.020 (2009).

35 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.060 (2009).

WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.28.010(1), 51.28.050 (2009).
37 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.28.020 (2009).
36
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immediately.38 The statute also requires the employer to notify the
Department of any injuries of which it is aware and allows the Department
to exact penalties for failure to observe this requirement. 39 For most
workers, this overview accurately describes the surprisingly simple claims
process.
Payment for the claims filed with the Department comes from the
state accident fund, administered by the Department4 ° RCW § 51.08.175
defines the term "state fund." First, the fund insures employers who
"secure the payment of industrial insurance benefits through the state."'t4 In
addition, the Department acts as the agency "to insure the industrial
insurance obligation of employers." 42 Each employer that is not acting as a
self-insurer for workers' compensation must insure their employees through
the state agency and pay premiums based on payroll reports to the state
fund.43 The statute additionally authorizes
the director of the Department to
44
pay the medical bills of injured workers.
The burden of providing money for the fund falls equally on the
employees and the employers. Employers are required to deduct one-half
of the required contribution from the worker's pay, and the employer pays
the remaining half.45 The amount of total premiums due to the state varies
according to the placement of each type of occupation on a classification
system set by the Department. 46 Interestingly, the legislature provided a
premium assessment system for some horse racing occupations. Although
it excludes jockeys, RCW § 51.16.210(1) includes grooms, exercise riders,
and pony riders both on and off the track." In addition, subsection (3)
identifies trainers as the employers of these individuals and assesses trainers
for premiums.49 While this section does not apply to jockeys, as the title
specifically exempts them, the statute clearly establishes that it is possible
to insure those in the horse racing business.
B.

The Claims Appeal Process

Despite the expansive coverage and simplicity of the premium and
claim processes, individuals often disagree with the Department's decision.
38 WASH.

REV. CODE § 51.28.020(2)(b) (2009).
39WASH. REV. CODE § 51.28.025(1), (2) (2009).
40WASH. REV. CODE § 51.36.010 (2009).
41WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.175 (2009).
42

id.

43WASH. REV. CODE § 51.16.060 (2009).
44 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.030(3) (2009).
45WASH. REv. CODE § 51.16.140(1) (2009).
46WASH.
47WASH.
48 WASH.
49 WASH.

REv. CODE § 51.16.035(l), (2) (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.16.210 (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.16.210(1) (2009).
REV. CODE § 51.16.210(3) (2009).
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If a worker objects to the Department's decision, he or she has sixty days to
file an appeal with either the Department or the Board of Industrial
Insurance Appeals ("the Board"). 50 On appeal, the appellant has the burden
of establishing a prima facie case for the relief sought. 5' Once the appeal is
received by the Board, an industrial appeals judge will hear the case. The
industrial appeals judge, who must simply be an active or judicial member
of the Washington state bar, possesses the power to make findings of fact
and of law, and submits these findings in writing to the Board.53
The parties have twenty days to file any appeals to the Board's
decision before it becomes final, and the statute specifically deems anything
not contested in the appeal to be admitted. 4 If neither party appeals the
decision of the industrial appeals judge, the statute requires the Board to
consider that decision as final. It cannot be appealed to the court system. 55
If the Board denies review or the final decision of the Board is
unsatisfactory to the worker, he or she may appeal to the state court system
within thirty days. 56 At the state level, review of the decision of the Board
is de novo but, like most administrative appeals, is limited to the record
before the court and no party may introduce new evidence. 7 Once in the
state court system, the appeal follows the normal appellate process.5
C.

Exclusionsfrom the Workers Compensation System

RCW § 51.12.020 automatically excludes very few occupations
from the workers' compensation system.59 Most involve temporary
employees with unsophisticated employers, such as domestic servants,
casually engaged musicians, or officers of corporations that the corporation
may elect to cover.6° Although persons employed on railways are excluded,
federal statute permits employees to sue their employers if those employers
have acted negligently.6' Of all horse racing personnel, Washington's
workers compensation system excludes only jockeys and does so
specifically.

50WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.050(1) (2009).
S1 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.050(2)(a) (2009).
52 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.104 (2009).

53Id.
5 Id.
55Id.

56 WASH.

REV. CODE § 51.52.110 (2009).

57 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.115 (2009).
58WASH. REV. CODE § 51.52.140 (2009).

59WASH. REv. CODE § 51.12.020 (2009).
0Id.
61 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.080 (2009); see also 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2009).
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Washington provides a general alternative exception to coverage. 62
Examining the requirements for qualification for exclusion under the
general exception reveals the characteristics of the types of occupations the
legislature wishes to exclude. The statute initially requires that the
employee is free from control over the performance of the service, the
service is outside the usual course of business of the employer or away
from the usual place of business, and that the employee is engaged
independently in business of the same nature as that which they contracted
to do.63
The legislature appears to articulate its reservations about various
occupations in these exceptions, yet these characteristics do not apply to
jockeys. Normally, one would expect that jockeys could obtain mandatory
coverage under the state system because coverage of jockeys does not
reflect the concerns expressed by the legislature in its generalized
exception, and many other excluded occupations do. However, the
legislature seems to specifically except those occupations in which
employers consistently and quickly change, or those with unsophisticated
employers who may not be aware of regulations and statutes. In addition to
the changing nature of their occupation, jockeys also engage in a sport that
is extremely hazardous and potentially expensive.
Although such
considerations may drive the list of exclusions in RCW § 51.12.020, a
system can be designed to accommodate these individuals, as exemplified
by the coverage of exercise riders and grooms, therefore raising the
question of why Washington specifically chooses to exclude jockeys from
workers' compensation coverage.
III. CASE HISTORY
Ochoa involved a licensed jockey acting as an exercise rider. 64 On
the morning of September 26, 1993, trainer Steven Quionez hired Ochoa to
exercise a horse.65 Ochoa hoped that this ride would open a discussion with
Quionez about racing the horse at a later time.66 The horse was not yet
scheduled for its next race, and Quionez had not yet decided who would
ride as jockey.6 7 Ochoa and Quionez entered into a verbal agreement to
ride the horse for exercise only on one particular morning and Quionez
would pay Ochoa a flat fee.68 Although Quionez was exercising the horse
on at Playfair Race Track during a meet, the horse was not entered in a race
62WASH. REV. CODE § 51.12.020(7) (2009).
63 WASH. REV. CODE § 51.08.195 (2009).
'A

Ochoa 11, 20 P.3d. at 940.

65 Id.

66Id.
67
1d.
6Id.
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or exercising during a race. 69 During the exercise period, the horse
panicked and flipped, crushing Ochoa's leg against a gate.7 ° Since the
accident, Ochoa has not been able to work. 7
Ochoa filed a claim with the Department for workers'
compensation, and after an initial denial, the Department agreed to offer
benefits to Ochoa in a letter dated July 22, 1994.72 Following this letter, the
Department paid $11,550.64 in benefits to Ochoa, charging Playfair, which
objected since Quionez was Ochoa's actual employer.73 The Department
agreed with Playfair, but then decided to deny Ochoa benefits altogether
rather than charging Quionez.74 The following spring, the Department
reversed itself twice more, but eventually decided to deny benefits to Ochoa
altogether.75 The final decision to deny benefits rested on the grounds that
the Department's original order granting benefits had not been properly
communicated to Quionez as required by statute. 6 The decision had
instead been communicated to Playfair.77
On appeal, an industrial insurance appeals judge decided Ochoa
was an exercise rider at the time of injury and was therefore entitled to
benefits. 7' After this decision, the Department filed for review with the
Board, which refused to accept the industrial insurance judge's
recommendation and instead found in favor of the Department on the
grounds that Ochoa was a jockey and therefore exempted from coverage.7 9
Ochoa appealed to the district court, which also found for the Department.
The Court of Appeals did as well, citing two main reasons.8 0 First, the court
noted that under Department regulation WAC 296-17-73105 jockeys were
jockeys during the entire dates of a race meet, and this exercise had taken
place during a race meet. 8' Second, the court found that prior decisions by
the Board that held that jockeys as exercise riders were covered had since
been undermined by subsequent regulations; therefore Ochoa was a jockey
and exempted from coverage under Washington law. 2

69 Ochoa II,
70

20 P.3d at 940.

Id.

71 Id.
72
73

Id. at 941-42.

1Id. at 941.

74 Ochoa v. Dep't of Labor & Indus. (Ochoa I), 999 P.2d 633, 634-635 (Wash. Ct. App.

2000).
Ochoa 1, 20 P.3d at 941.
P.2d at 635.
77Ochoa 11, 20 P.3d at 941.
's

76 Ochoa 1, 999

78Id.

79Id.
80Ochoa I, 999 P.2d at 636.
81Id.
12 Id. at

636-637.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

A.

Holding

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled in favor of
Ochoa and granted benefits. 83 The court's rationale rested on the fact that
under prior case law the determination of eligibility turned on the nature of
the activity being performed by the worker. In addition, jockeys and
exercise riders were recognized in Washington as two separate job
functions. Based on this reasoning, the court held that Ochoa was covered
under the mandatory workers compensation statute and entitled to receive
benefits.84
B.

PRIOR HOLDINGS OF THE BOARD

The court first noted its extreme deference toward administrative
agencies in their "interpretation of regulations falling within its area of
expertise. ' 85 It then moved on to consider the distinction that the Board had
previously drawn between exercise riders and jockeys; the court essentially
stated that the facts of the case at bar were substantially similar to two prior
decisions.86 The two cited cases, In re John B. Heath 7 and In re Rick. L.
8 dealt with facts "almost identical"
Obrist,1
to Ochoa's situation.89 The
Board explicitly recognized in both these cases that
licensed jockeys often engage in engage in different types
of employment depending on whether they are preparing
horse to ride in a race (the function of a jockey) or whether
they are running a horse through a required regiment to
keep the horse in racing condition (the function of an
exercise rider).90
Because of standard practices in the horse racing industry, the Board
recognized that the responsibilities of a jockey begin approximately an hour
before the horse's race, while exercise riders generally prepare the horse on
a daily basis. 9' The Supreme Court of Washington noted that in Heath and
Ochoa If, 20 P.3d at 943.
Id. at 942-943.
" Ochoa II, 20 P.3d at 941 (citing Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726
'
"

(2000)).

86 Ochoa

I,20 P.3d at 941.
In re John B. Heath, Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals No. J-405488 (1985).
8 In re Rick L. Obrist, Bd. of Indus. Ins. Appeals No. J-427080 (1985).
9 Ochoa II, 20 P.3d at 941.
87

90Id. at 941.
91Id. (citing Heath, slip op. at 2; Obrist,slip op. at 3).
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Obrist, the Board specifically recognized that if a jockey, although licensed,
is being paid separately for exercise riding during a training regimen, not as
part of a normal jockey contract, then that jockey is acting as an exercise
rider for the purposes of workers' compensation.92
The Board, the Department, and the Court of Appeals attempted to
dismiss these rulings on the basis that subsequent regulations promulgated
by the Department had eroded their rationale.9 3 The Washington Supreme
Court rejected these arguments, saying that the Court of Appeals
erroneously believed that the rulings were founded on the Department's
regulatory language.9 4 It then pointed out that even if this interpretation
was correct, the subsequent changes did not signify large enough alterations
to nullify the previous holdings. 95
In order to reach these conclusions, the court first observed that the
riders in Heath and Obrist were licensed jockeys who were injured while
working to put horses through exercise programs.9 6 The Board in those
cases recognized that industry practice itself recognized the different "hats"
of the riders, whatever their licensure. 97 The Court of Appeals relied on the
regulatory language of former WAC 296-17-73105 to establish that jockeys
were to be considered exercise riders only at a time "other than . . .the
dates of a scheduled race meet. 98 Therefore, the Court of Appeals decided
that workers' compensation law could never consider a jockey to be an
exercise rider during the dates of a meet, regardless of whether the jockey
was actually racing. 99 Because the race meet was technically in session at
Playfair, Ochoa fell into the jockey classification and therefore could not
receive benefits.'0 0 The Court of Appeals claimed that this new regulation
replaced previous language distinguishing between "racing jockeys" and
"jockeys and exercise boys;" because in the interpretation of the Court of
Appeals the distinction intended by the statute was one of timing, not
function, Heath and Obristno longer applied.' 0'
The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, deciding instead that
the regulatory language at issue was at best a supporting feature of those
Board decisions. 10 2 Instead, the court believed that Heath and Obrist rested
on the function the jockeys performed rather than a formalistic

Id. at 942.
93id.
94Ochoa II, 20 P.3d at 942.
9

95Id.
96Id. at 941-942.

97id.
98 Ochoa I, 999 P.2d at 636.
99Id.
10OId.
101Id.

'02 Ochoa I, 20 P.3d at 942.
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classification. 10 3 Because the jockeys performed the functions of exercise
riders, then for purposes of workers' compensation the jockeys should be
considered exercise riders and entitled to coverage.' °4 The Supreme Court
in Ochoa's case decided that despite a slight change in regulatory language,
Heath and Obrist still applied.' 0 The key question in the case, therefore,
revolved 10around
the actual function of the rider at the time of the injury in
6
question.

In addition to its characterization of the holdings in the two
previous Board decisions, the Supreme Court dashed the notion that even if
these subsequent regulatory changes had abrogated Heath and Obrist that
the distinction between exercise riders and jockeys would be eliminated.10 7
Current regulations still recognized a difference between the two."°8 In
addition, the Department asked the court to decide that jockeys could never
be exercise riders during the regular season, and given the absence of any
limiting language in the statute, the court declined to do so. 109
The court also pointed out that workers' compensation represents a
coherent and comprehensive statutory scheme. The Department cannot,
with regard to jockeys, ignore previous rulings of the Washington Supreme
Court applying to the system in general." ° The court has often recognized
that employees may and often do "wear different hats throughout the course
of their employment and their coverage.., is often dependent on which hat
they are wearing at the time of the accident."' '
A long line of cases
established that a worker often performs more than one task and some may
be covered while others may not." 2 Therefore, when determining whether
a rider is covered by workers compensation, "[t]he Department must look to
the rider's work status and the employment practices in the horse
industry."' 3
The Washington Supreme Court essentially decided to reject a
reading of the regulations and statutes that would have allowed the
Department to refuse coverage to jockeys by simply claiming that a race
meet was in session. Instead, the holding forces the Department to inquire
as to exactly what function the jockey was performing, as well as what
functions he may have been expected to perform by both the horse racing

Id.
04
5
10
' Id.
1d"
103

105Id.

"6 See id. at 943.
'07 Ochoa II,
20 P.3d at 942.
108Id.
'09
Id. at 942-943.
0
" Id. at 943.
"' Id. at 943 (referencing Musson v. Dep't. of Labor and Industries, 470 P.2d 183 (1970)).
112 Ochoa
, 20 P.3d at 943.
113id.
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industry and his employer.' 14 If the jockey functioned as an exercise rider,
he or she should be covered as such and, if not, he or she should not be
entitled to benefits under the jockey exclusion in RCW § 51.12.020(7).
C.

Application to Ochoa

In the case at bar, the jockey entered into a verbal agreement with a
trainer to exercise a horse for a flat fee."' Although the jockey hoped to
become a race jockey, they discussed nothing of the sort and the horse was
not entered to race. 1 6 In addition, his fee came directly from the trainer,
not from winnings of any sort.1 7 Finally, while a race meet was technically
in session, no races would be held on the course for several more hours." 18
For these reasons, the Washington Supreme Court held that Ochoa was in
fact an exercise rider at the time of his injury and was therefore entitled to
workers compensation benefits. 19
V. IMPLICATIONS

Ochoa offers important and interesting possibilities in the current
battle over the coverage of jockeys in state workers' compensation
schemes.
In acknowledging that a place in mandatory workers'
compensation schemes exists not only for jockeys but also generally for
track personnel, including grooms and exercise riders, the ruling of the
Washington Supreme Court may benefit jockeys in other states.
Washington has answered one of the largest questions facing the jockeys:
who pays?
Because of the fluid nature of jockey employment, the different
parties who could potentially pay premiums continually fight over who
should do so. Tracks, who employ huge numbers of people, do not want
the high risk, and trainers struggle with the often irregular nature of cash
flow to pay the premiums. The Washington system already allows for
coverage for exercise riders, specifically designating trainers as employers
for the purpose of workers' compensation.' 2 Especially when a trainer
regularly employs a jockey as a racing jockey, the situation seems similar to
that of an exercise rider or a groom. Ochoa leaves the question
unanswered, but it accepts without challenge the contention of the trial
court that the trainer is the responsible party on whom premiums should be
114id.
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assessed. If exercise riders can obtain coverage, then jockeys have a strong
argument that their situation is sufficiently similar to require equal
treatment under the law. The statutory nature of workers compensation,
however, may trend against such an argument, given that no mandate exists
for the existence of the system as a whole except what the legislature
chooses to create.
In addition, it is important to note that the final decision rested on
the failure of the Department to communicate to the appropriate payor. In
Ochoa's case, the Department had made the mistake of sending the
notification to the track instead of his trainer.' 21 Both the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court leave this issue open, leaving one to wonder how
this notice requirement impacts such a highly fluid employment system as
the jockey system. A jockey may ride for multiple trainers at once, often in
an injured state. Jockeys move from one horse to another very rapidly and
the sequence of an injury may be impossible to determine; therefore the
Department must be certain to get the notice to the right trainer in a highly
mobile population. Furthermore, jockeys may only be responsible for a
horse for one hour at a time, and developing a premium schedule for such
rapid movement may be difficult both to develop and administrate.
Currently most of those in the horse racing industry buy their own
health insurance plans on the open private market. If the state offers
workers' compensation coverage to these individuals, including jockeys
and exercise riders, it opens a discussion about providing further benefits,
such as comprehensive health insurance, since some kind of payment
system can clearly be established. Trainers and tracks may therefore have
further reason to resist the offering of coverage, seeing it as a floodgate of
tremendous expenses for which they may be responsible.
VI. CONCLUSION

In Ochoa, the Washington Supreme Court reinforced the
importance of the actual function of an employee at the time of injury in
determining his or her eligibility for coverage. Although a statutory right, it
is not one that the Department of Labor and Industries can interpret in a
vacuum - the Court requires the Department to take into account industry
practices and expectations. To this end, licensed jockeys are offered a
small bite of the rights offered generally if they act as an exercise rider, and
this possibility of coverage opens far-reaching implications that may help
jockeys to eventually attain workers' compensation coverage.
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